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'RC DAILY DOSE'
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PASSAGE – 1

Modern thought has realized considerable progress by reducing the existent to the series of appearances which manifest it. Its aim was to overcome a certain number of dualisms which have embarrassed philosophy and to replace them by the monism of the phenomenon. Has the attempt been successful ?

In the first place we certainly thus get rid of that dualism which in the existent opposes interior to exterior. There is no longer an exterior for the existent if one means by that a superficial covering which hides from sight the true nature of the object. And *ibis* true nature in turn, if it is to be the secret reality of the thing, which one can have a presentiment of or which one can suppose but can never reach because it is the "interior" of the object under consideration-this nature no longer exists. The appearances which manifest the existent are neither interior nor exterior; they are all equal, they all refer to other appearances, and none of them is privileged. Force, for example, is not a metaphysical conatus of an unknown kind which hides behind its effects (accelerations, deviations. etc.); it is the totality of these effects. Similarly an electric current does not have a secret reverse side; it is nothing but the totality of the physical-chemical actions which manifest it (electrolysis, the incandescence of a carbon filament, the displacement of the needle of a galvanometer, etc.). No one of these actions alone is sufficient to reveal it. But no action indicates anything which is behind itself; it indicates only itself and the total series.

The obvious conclusion is that the dualism of being and appearance is no longer entitled to any legal status within philosophy. The appearance refers to the total series of appearances and not to a hidden reality which would drain to itself all the being of the existent. And the appearance for its part is not an inconsistent manifestation of this being. To the extent that men had believed in noumenal realities, they have presented appearance as a pure negative. It was "that which is not being"; it had no other being than that of illusion and error. But even this being was borrowed, it was itself a pretense, and philosophers met with the greatest difficulty in maintaining cohesion and existence in the appearance so that it should not itself be reabsorbed in the depth of non- phenomenal being. But if we once get away from what Nietzsche called "the illusion of worlds-behind-the-scene," and if we no longer believe in the being-behind-the-appearance, then the appearance becomes full positivity; its essence is an "appearing" which is no longer opposed to being but on the contrary is the measure of it. For the being of an existent is exactly what it appears. Thus we arrive at the idea of the phenomenon such as we can find, for example, in the "phenomenology" of Husserl or of Heidegger-the phenomenon of the relative-absolute. Relative the phenomenon remains, for "to appear" supposes in essence somebody to whom to appear. But it does not have the double relativity of Kant's *Erscheinung*. It does not point over its shoulder to a true being which would be, for it, absolute. What it is, it is absolutely, for it reveals itself as it is. The phenomenon can be studied and described as such, for it is absolutely indicative of itself.

The duality of potency and act falls by the same stroke. The act is everything. Behind the act there is neither potency nor "hexis" nor virtue. We shall refuse, for example, to understand by "genius"-in the sense in which we say that Proust "had genius" or that he "was" a genius-a particular capacity to produce certain works, which was not exhausted exactly in producing them. The genius of Proust is neither the work considered in isolation nor the subjective ability to produce it; the work is considered as the totality of the manifestations of the person.

1. Which of the following most agrees to what the author has to say in the passage ?
 - (1) The dualism of 'being' and 'appearance' has legal standing within philosophy.
 - (2) The 'appearance' is the total series of appearances and is not a hidden reality, which would cease to exist.
 - (3) The 'act' is not everything, it is the 'virtue' or 'potency' behind it, which matters.
 - (4) All except (1).
2. All of the following are true, with respect to the passage, except that :
 - (1) modern thought aims to strengthen dualism.
 - (2) the genius of a person is not manifest in the work considered in isolation nor the subjective ability to produce it.
 - (3) the 'appearance' is a consistent manifestation of the 'being'.
 - (4) dualism does not oppose interior to the exterior.
3. As per the passage, 'appearance' which portrays the 'existent' is :
 - (1) exterior.
 - (2) interior.
 - (3) neither interior or exterior.
 - (4) relative absolute.

4. *As per the passage, the aim of the modern thought was to :*
 - (1) do away with dualisms that have embarrassed the philosophy.
 - (2) replace the dualisms by the monism.
 - (3) realise considerable progress by linking the existent to the series of appearances manifesting it.
 - (4) All of the above.
5. *All of the following are false, with respect to the passage, except that :*
 - (1) 'exterior' is the superficial covering which conceals, from sight, the true nature of the object.
 - (2) the work of a genius does not reflect the totality of the person's manifestation.
 - (3) 'appearance' was thought of as negative, as long as people believed in realising realities that were perceptible through intuition.
 - (4) The noumenon can be studied and described, as it is absolutely indicative of itself.
6. *The idea of 'act' is best represented by which of the following ?*
 - (1) An 'act' is linked to 'potency' and 'virtue' behind it.
 - (2) The 'act' is the result of premeditated 'plans'.
 - (3) There is no 'potency' or 'virtue' behind an 'act'.
 - (4) None of the above.
7. *A suitable title for the passage is :*
 - (1) Modern Thought And Dualism.
 - (2) Noumenal Realities - A Popular Belief.
 - (3) 'Being' And 'Appearance' - Their Non-relationship.
 - (4) Force Is Totality Of Several Effects.
8. *The style of handling the passage is :*
 - (1) satiric.
 - (2) deductive.
 - (3) descriptive.
 - (4) intuitive.
9. *The passage is on :*
 - (1) genealogy.
 - (2) psychology.
 - (3) philosophy.
 - (4) theology.
10. *As per the passage, 'dualism' is best explained by :*
 - (1) 'being' being distinct from 'appearance'.
 - (2) 'potency' and 'act' being inter linked.
 - (3) opposition of 'exterior' to 'interior' in the 'existent' entity.
 - (4) None of the above.

PASSAGE – 2

Nothingness must be given at the heart of Being, in order for us to be able to apprehend that particular type of realities which we have called negatites. But this intra-mundane Nothingness cannot be produced by Being-in-itself; the notion of Being as full positivity does not contain Nothingness as one of its structures. We cannot even say that Being excludes it. Being lacks all relation with it. Hence the question which is put to us now with a particular urgency: if Nothingness can be conceived neither outside of Being, nor in terms of Being, and if on the other hand, since it is non-being, it cannot derive from itself the necessary force to "nihilate itself," where does Nothingness come from?

If we wish to pursue the problem further, we must first recognize that we cannot grant to nothingness the property ' , of "nihilating itself." For although the expression "to nihilate itself" is thought of as removing from nothingness the last semblance of being, we must recognize that only Being can nihilate itself; however it comes about, in order to nihilate itself, it must be. But Nothingness is not. If we can speak of it, it is only because it possesses an appearance of being, a borrowed being, as we have noted above. Nothingness is not, Nothingness "is made-to-be," Nothingness does not nihilate itself; Nothingness "is nihilated." It follows therefore that there must exist a Being (this cannot be the In itself) of which the property is to nihilate Nothingness, to support it in its being, to sustain it perpetually in its very existence, a being by which nothingness comes to things. But how can this Being be related to Nothingness so that through it Nothingness comes to things? We must observe first that the being postulated cannot be passive in relation to Nothingness, cannot receive it; Nothingness could not come to this being except through another Being-which would be an infinite regress. But on the other hand, the Being by which Nothingness comes to the world cannot produce Nothingness while remaining indifferent to that production-like the Stoic cause which produces its effect without being itself changed. It would be inconceivable that a Being which is full positivity should maintain and create outside itself a Nothingness or transcendent being, for there would be nothing in Being by which Being could surpass itself towards Non- Being. The Being by which Nothingness arrives in the world must nihilate Nothingness in its Being, and even so it still runs the risk of establishing Nothingness as a transcendent in the very heart of immanence unless it nihilates Nothingness in its being in connection with its own being. The Being by which Nothingness arrives in the world is a being such that in its Being, the Nothingness of its Being is in question. The being by which Nothingness comes to the world must be its own Nothingness. By this we must understand not a nihilating act, which would require in turn a foundation in Being, but an ontological characteristic of the Being required. It remains to learn in what delicate, exquisite region of Being we shall encounter that Being which is its own Nothingness.

We shall be helped in our inquiry by a more complete examination of the conduct which served us as a point of departure. We must return to the question. We have seen, it may be recalled, that every question, in essence, posits the possibility of a negative reply. In a question we question a being about its being or its way of being. This way of being or this being is veiled; there always remains the possibility that it may unveil itself as a Nothingness. But from the very fact that we presume that an Existent can always be revealed as nothing, every question supposes that we realize a nihilating withdrawal in relation to the given, which becomes a simple presentation, fluctuating between being and Nothingness.

It is essential therefore that the questioner have the permanent possibility of dissociating himself from the causal series which constitutes being and which can produce only being. If we admitted that the question is determined in the questioner by universal determinism, the question would thereby become unintelligible and even inconceivable. A real cause, in fact, produces a real effect and the caused being is wholly engaged by the cause in positivity; to the extent that its being depends on the cause, it cannot have within itself the tiniest germ of nothingness. Thus in so far as the questioner must be able to effect in relation to the questioned a kind of nihilating withdrawal, he is not subject to the causal order of the world; he detaches himself from Being. This means that by a double movement of nihilation he nihilates the thing questioned in relation to himself by placing it in a neutral state, between being and non-being-and that he nihilates himself in relation to the thing questioned by wrenching himself from being in order to be able to bring out of himself the possibility of a non-being. Thus in posing a question, a certain negative element is introduced into the world. We see nothingness making the world iridescent, casting a shimmer over things. But at the same time the question emanates from a questioner who, in order to motivate himself in his being as one who questions, disengages himself from being. This disengagement is then, by definition, a human process. Man presents himself at least in this instance as a being who causes Nothingness to arise in the world, inasmuch as he himself is affected with non-being to this end.

11. *All of the following are in place, as far as the passage is concerned, except that :*
 - (1) a real cause produces a real effect.
 - (2) in posing a question, a certain negative element is introduced into the world.
 - (3) 'Nothingness' is, 'nothingness' is 'not made to be'.
 - (4) 'Being' lacks all relationship with 'Nothingness'.
12. *As per the passage, if universal determinism in the questioner's mind determines the question, then :*
 - (1) the questioner associates himself with the causal series which constitutes and produces 'being'.
 - (2) the question would become unintelligible and even inconceivable.
 - (3) 'being' becomes 'nothing', 'nothingness' is questioned.
 - (4) disengagement is a human process.
13. *As per the passage, every question has the possibility of a :*
 - (1) counter question.
 - (2) sincere and intense search for an answer.
 - (3) misunderstanding created between the poser and the person to whom the question is posed.
 - (4) negative reply.
14. *According to the passage, 'Nothingness' :*
 - (1) 'is nihilated'.
 - (2) does not come from anything.
 - (3) does not nihilate itself.
 - (4) All except (2).
15. *The central idea of the passage is that :*
 - (1) the 'being' by which 'Nothingness' comes to the world must be its own 'Nothingness'.
 - (2) man is a 'being' causing 'Nothingness' to arise in the world.
 - (3) An 'existent' can always be revealed as 'something'.
 - (4) 'Being' has an exquisite relationship with 'nothingness'.
16. *The author has handled the passage with a mix of :*
 - (1) metaphysics and mathematics.
 - (2) psychology and human biology.
 - (3) philosophy and logic.
 - (4) morality and sociology.
17. *Which of the following would go against the viewpoint of the author, as expressed in the passage ?*
 - (1) The caused 'being' has its 'being' depending on the 'cause'.
 - (2) The caused 'being' can have, within itself, the tiniest germ of 'nothingness'.
 - (3) The caused 'being' is wholly engaged by the 'cause' in positivity.
 - (4) None of the above.

18. *A suitable title for the passage is :*
- | | |
|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| (1) Existence And Nothingness. | (2) Cause And Effect. |
| (3) Being And Nothingness. | (4) Nihilation By 'Nothingness'. |
19. *The passage is at best an adaptation from :*
- (1) notings of a psychologist wanting to arrive at certain behavioural characteristics.
 - (2) the musings of a noted thinker cum philosopher.
 - (3) the best essay on 'Being Nothing' by a student of first year.
 - (4) the conclusions of sociologists studying changes in human mindset.
20. *Which of the following is false with respect to the viewpoint expressed in the passage ?*
- (1) 'Nothingness' makes the world iridescent, casting a shimmer over things.
 - (2) A questioner is not subject to the causal order of the world, he detaches himself from 'Being'.
 - (3) 'Nothingness' is spoken about as it is a 'borrowed being', possessing an appearance of a 'being'.
 - (4) Man least presents as a 'being' causing 'Nothingness' to arise in the world inasmuch as being affected by 'non-being' to this end.



Detailed Solutions

1. **Ans.(2).** Options (2) is the correct one, for the third paragraph states it. Options (1) and (3) are not true, for the opening line of the third paragraph and the second and third lines of the last paragraph state their opposite. Option (4) is incorrect.
2. **Ans.(1).** Options (2), (3) and (4) find their place in the passage. The last paragraph, the third paragraph and the second paragraph all state and validate them. Option (1) falls out, for the opening line of the passage states the opposite of it. Hence option (1) is the sought one.
3. **Ans.(3).** Option (3) is in place for the second paragraph states that 'appearance' is neither interior or exterior, there is equality in exterior and interior appearance. None of them is privileged. The remaining options (1) and (2) are incorrect, as per the passage, and option (4) is not stated in the passage.
4. **Ans.(4).** Each of the options (1), (2) and (3) is present in the passage. The first paragraph states and upholds them. All of them are sought, however, option (4), their combination is the appropriate one.
5. **Ans.(3).** Each of the options (1), (2) and (4) are false, for the passage does not state them or imply them. Option (3) is in place and is endorsed by the third paragraph. Option (3) is the one sought.
6. **Ans.(3).** Options (1) and (2) are wrong. The last paragraph refutes it. Option (3) is in place as the third sentence in the last paragraph states it.
7. **Ans.(1).** The passage is about dualism occupying the prime position in modern thought. The passage elaborates the idea of dualism. Option (1) best represents this and is the suitable title for the passage. The remaining options are not apt titles for the passage does not portray them.
8. **Ans.(2).** The passage is not satiric, descriptive or intuitive. Deductions are made from certain notions and conclusions arrived at. Hence option (2) is the appropriate one and options (1), (3) and (4) are incorrect.
9. **Ans.(3).** Clearly, the passage is on philosophy. Option (3) is intact. The remaining options (1), (2) and (4) are not correct.
10. **Ans.(4).** None of the options (1), (2) and (3) describes the idea of dualism, as explained in the passage. Options (1), (2) and (3) are not apt, leading to option (4) getting the tick.
11. **Ans.(3).** Options (1), (2) and (4) are in place. The last paragraph, the second last paragraph and the first paragraph makes a mention of them. Option (3) is not correct since the second paragraph negated it by having its opposite stated. Hence option (3) is the one sought.
12. **Ans.(2).** Options (1), (3) and (4) are ridiculous and certainly does not find its place in the passage. Option (2) is stated in the last paragraph. Hence the sought option is (2).
13. **Ans.(4).** Options (1), (2) and (3) find no place in the passage, direct or implicit. The passage does not state them. Option (4), is in place. The penultimate paragraph states and uphold option (4).
14. **Ans.(4).** Option (2) is not stated anywhere in the passage. Options (1) and (3) find their place in the passage. The second paragraph states and upholds them. Hence options (1) and (3) are the sought ones. However, option (4), a combination of (1) and (3), is the best one.
15. **Ans.(1).** Options (3) and (4) are incorrect, for the passage refutes them in the penultimate and the opening paragraph. Option (1) aptly represents the central idea of the passage. The passage elaborates the abstract idea of 'nothingness' and 'being'. Option (2) finds its place in the last paragraph but comes out weak against option (1).
16. **Ans.(3).** The passage is about philosophy with a dash of logic. Through reason and logical deductions, conclusions on abstract ideas are derived. Option (3) is in place as the correct one. Options (1), (2) and (4) are incorrect, for the passage does not relate to them.
17. **Ans.(2).** Options (1) and (3) are in place. The last paragraph mentions them. Option (2) is not correct, as the same paragraph does not endorse it. Rather the opposite of this option is stated. Hence option (2) goes against the author's viewpoint and is the one sought.
18. **Ans.(3).** The passage is about 'Being' and 'Nothingness' and their relationship. Option (3) is the best title for the passage. Options (1) and (4) are not suitable titles and can be bypassed. Although option (2) is obliquely referred to in the passage, it does not pass off as the title for the passage.
19. **Ans.(2).** Option (2) best depicts the source from where the passage could have been extracted. The remaining options (1), (3) and (4) are unlikely the sources of extraction of the passage.
20. **Ans.(4).** Each of the options (1), (2) and (3) find their place in the passage, in the last paragraph and the second paragraph. Option (4) is negated in the last paragraph which has its opposite stated in the last line. Option (4) is the sought one.

Answer Keys

20.(4)	19.(2)	18.(3)	17.(2)	16.(3)	15.(1)	14.(4)	13.(4)	12.(2)	11.(3)
10.(4)	9.(3)	8.(2)	7.(1)	6.(3)	5.(3)	4.(4)	3.(3)	2.(1)	1.(2)